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Of Mosquitoes, Adolescents, and Reproductive 
Rights: Public Health and Reproductive Risks in 
a Genomic Age 
Luke Haqq* 
Until recently, microcephaly was an uncommon condition, 
with the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC) es-
timating it typically affects between two and twelve babies per 
10,000 live births in the United States.1 The current pandemic 
emerged in French Polynesia in 2013.2 By the end of 2014, the 
Brazilian government had already initiated an investigation in-
to several thousands of cases of microcephaly, a birth defect 
that typically affected 150 infants annually in Brazil.3 The vi-
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 1. Nat’l Birth Defects Prevention Network, Major Birth Defects Data 
from Population-Based Birth Defects Surveillance Programs in the United 
States, 2006–2010, 97 CLINICAL & MOLECULAR TERATOLOGY S1 (2013); Facts 
About Microcephaly, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www 
.cdc.gov/ncbddd/birthdefects/microcephaly.html (last updated July 25, 2016). 
 2. See Van-Mai Cao-Lormeau et al., Gillain-Barré Syndrome Outbreak 
Associated with Zika Virus Infection in French Polynesia: A Case-Control 
Study, 387 LANCET 1531 (2016); Erwan Oehler et al., Zika Virus Infection 
Complicated by Guillain-Barré Syndrome – Case Report, French Polynesia, De-
cember 2013, 19 EUROSURVEILLANCE 1 (2014); Louise Watrin et al. Guillain-
Barré Syndrome (42 Cases) Occurring During a Zika Virus Outbreak in French 
Polynesia, 95 MED. e3257 (2016). 
 3. Donald G. McNeil, Jr. et al., Short Answers to Hard Questions About 
Zika Virus, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2016/health/what-is-zika-virus.html?_r=0. 
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rus threatens to infect as many as four million people globally 
in 2016,4 and the World Health Organization and CDC have 
declared that there is scientific consensus, not just anecdotal 
reports, that the Aedes aegypti mosquito-borne virus causes mi-
crocephaly,5 among other birth defects.6 The virus has spread 
from Oceania to South and North America, with CDC data re-
vealing 2920 laboratory-confirmed, travel-associated cases in 
every state but Alaska, South Dakota, and Wyoming, twenty-
four of which were sexually transmitted.7 On July 4, 2016, “a 
patient entered an emergency room in Miami-Dade County 
with a fever, a rash and joint pain,”8 the first of forty-three cas-
es confirmed to be transmitted in the United States through lo-
cal mosquitoes.9 Some microcephalics can develop normally.10 
Some cases may not become apparent until symptoms like sei-
zures develop in childhood, but when the birth defect is pro-
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Michaeleen Doucleff, Zika Is Linked to Microcephaly, Health Agencies 
Confirm, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/ 
thetwo-way/2016/03/31/472607576/health-agencies-confirm-zika-is-linked 
-with-microcephaly. 
 6. A preliminary New England Journal of Medicine report tracked 
eighty-eight pregnant women in Rio de Janeiro from September 2015 to Feb-
ruary 2016. Patrícia Brasil et al., Zika Virus Infection in Pregnant Women in 
Rio de Janeiro—Preliminary Report, NEW ENG. J. MED., Mar. 4, 2016, at 1. Of 
these eighty-eight women who had exhibited a rash, eighty-two percent tested 
positive for Zika. Id. at 3. The preliminary report concludes that it causes not 
only microcephaly but also “appears to be associated with grave outcomes, in-
cluding fetal death, placental insufficiency, fetal growth restriction, and [cen-
tral nervous system] injury.” Id. at 1. One Zika expert suggests microcephaly 
“may just be the tip of the iceberg” of effects that Zika can have on fetuses. 
Lena H. Sun, Zika Expert: ‘Microcephaly May Just Be the Tip of the Iceberg,’ 
WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your 
-health/wp/2016/02/09/zika-expert-microcephaly-may-just-be-the-tip-of-the 
-iceberg. For example, preliminary evidence has shown pregnant women in-
fected with Zika virus may give birth to babies that are not microcephalic but 
do have neurological lesions. Id. 
 7. Zika Virus: Case Counts in the US, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/zika/geo/united-states.html. 
 8. Pam Belluck, Patch of Miami Is Ground Zero for the Zika Virus, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/health/zika-virus 
-florida.html?_r=0. 
 9. Zika Virus: Case Counts in the US, supra note 7. 
 10. One mother, for example, describes her six-year-old with microcephaly 
as “the busiest guy ever . . . . He walks, runs . . . rides bikes, plays soccer, rides 
horses, you name it.” Sean’s Story, PMGAWARENESS.ORG (Sept. 9, 2012), 
http://pmgawareness.org/seans-story. At the same time, the woman also noted 
that, during her pregnancy, she and her husband “were never taken aside and 
told what [m]icrocephaly really meant and what it may or may not involve.” 
Id. 
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nounced, the vast majority born with it die in infancy or child-
hood.11 
It is only in recent times that parents have had access to 
robust “reproductive choice information,”12 including infor-
mation about mosquito-borne teratogens, environmental toxins, 
pharmaceutical side effects, carrier status, and gene variants 
that could lead to birth defects in future progeny.13 Develop-
ments including ultrasonography, chorionic villus sampling, in 
vitro fertilization, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and, per-
haps most importantly, the abortion right14 further lowered the 
rate of birth defects in the United States. In the past decade, 
abilities to prevent defects have become even more refined with 
the advent of clinical genomic sequencing. Preconception, pre-
 
 11. See, e.g., Yoko Imaizumi, Prevalence and Mortality Rates of Micro-
cephaly in Japan, 1969–1992, 34 CONGENITAL ANOMALIES 131, 131 (1994) 
(finding the mean age at time of death for microcephalics rose from three 
years in 1969–1971 to thirteen from 1990–1992). 
 12. “Reproductive choice information,” as used in this Note, is that which 
is germane to reproductive autonomy, and is synonymous with results or in-
formation of “reproductive significance” or “reproductive importance.” It is not 
synonymous with “reproductive health information.” Reproductive choice in-
formation guides the deliberations one makes about reproduction generally, 
such as whether to use natural family planning, contraception, abortion, and 
genetic testing. Further, it includes information on options like prenatal vita-
mins, and pharmaceuticals labeled as Category D or X by the Food and Drug 
Administration. Reproductive health information, in contrast, refers more to 
issues of fertility, birth control, cancer screening via pap smears, and sexually 
transmitted infections. 
 13. Still, there is ample evidence that parents have acted on rudimentary 
forms of such information throughout history. Selective infanticide, for exam-
ple, was “ubiquitous in most preliterate cultures, ranging from about a third 
or more of all children born . . . . [C]ensus figures from antiquity show boy/girl 
ratios as high as 400 boys to 100 girls—a believable figure since, as 
Poseidippos said, ‘even a rich man always exposes a daughter.’” Lloyd 
DeMause, A History of Child Abuse, 25 J. PSYCHOHISTORY 216, 226 (1998). In 
the decade before Roe v. Wade, the United States experienced two massive 
spikes in birth defects during the 1960s. EVA R. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, 
AND THE COURTS 21 (1982); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 259 (1991). National Institute of Child 
Health and Human Development efforts since the 1960s have successfully 
prevented the debilitating effects of the birth defect phenylketonuria (PKU), 
just as the rate of neural tube defects dropped once women began using prena-
tal vitamins following discoveries that linked defects to folate deficiency. Brief 
History of Newborn Screening, NIH EUNICE KENNEDY SHRIVER NAT’L INST. OF 
CHILD HEALTH & HUM. DEV. (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.nichd.nih.gov/ 
health/topics/newborn/conditioninfo/Pages/history.aspx. 
 14. See, for example, sources cited infra note 37 (noting over fifty years of 
data showing that most women who are informed of a fetal abnormality will 
choose to abort). 
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natal, and neonatal sequencing offer promising ways to prevent 
the existence of, diagnose, treat, and cure hundreds of serious 
birth defects early on, conditions that may otherwise go unno-
ticed until a point when they are no longer correctable. This in-
formation is important because it can expand reproductive au-
tonomy, it can offer information to people considering sexual 
activity and reproduction that may be germane to moral choic-
es, and it can make a palpable difference in the lives of future 
children. 
With such reproductive choice-generating technologies 
available in the U.S., parents can now access much of their 
child’s health information from sources including routine ma-
ternal serum tests during pregnancy visits, specific tests par-
ents may request be done on the fetus prior to birth or the in-
fant after birth, and state-run newborn screening programs. 
This increased access to information offers parents reproduc-
tive choices, helps prevent the existence of birth defects, and 
can mitigate their effects if they do occur. Crucially, however, 
this paradigm shift also raises concerns because neither the 
federal government nor the majority of states recognize that 
the child whose health information is obtained has any rights 
to keep that information private, and these concerns will be 
magnified in a genomic age. In nearly all states, unemanci-
pated minors have no presumptive rights to refuse if parents 
want to have their child’s genome sequenced. If parents do elect 
for sequencing, prevailing medical recommendations permit 
parents to choose that the results not be returned to the child, 
with the exception of results revealing a life-threatening condi-
tion.15 
This framework is problematic because sequencing a child 
often reveals that child’s reproductive choice information.16 No 
laws protect this aspect of the genome even though the same 
information receives heightened privacy protections in non-
genomic contexts.17 Reproductive choice information, though, is 
 
 15. See Laurence B. McCullough et al., Professionally Responsible Disclo-
sure of Genomic Sequencing Results in Pediatric Practice, 136 PEDIATRICS 
e974 (2015); Laine Friedman Ross et al., Technical Report: Ethical and Policy 
Issues in Genetic Testing and Screening of Children, 15 GENETICS MED. 234 
(2013). 
 16. McCullough et al., supra note 15; Ross et al., supra note 15. 
 17. Ellen Wright Clayton, How Much Control Do Children and Adoles-
cents Have over Genomic Testing, Parental Access to Their Results, and Paren-
tal Communication of Those Results to Others?, 43 J.L. MED. ETHICS 538, 539 
(2015). 
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an aspect of the genome especially germane to a child’s sexual 
and reproductive choices. As such, privacy protections under 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA), Title X of the Public Health and Safety Act, and state 
laws should be construed to protect that aspect of the genome 
as an adolescent’s private information. Further, public health 
interests are served by encouraging people to be informed by 
their reproductive choice information before they become sex-
ually active. Public funding, such as Medicaid expansions un-
der the Affordable Care Act and the Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program, should promote general knowledge about 
genomics and reproductive choice information through state-
run sex education curricula that introduce key concepts like 
genetics, inheritance, and reproductive risks.18 
This Note stresses the importance of having access to one’s 
reproductive choice information—a particular problem for ado-
lescents in a genomic age. Part I presents an overview of the 
recent emergence of genomics in the clinical setting, with focus 
given to problems it creates for adolescent reproductive 
healthcare. Part II analyzes prevailing medical recommenda-
tions regarding the return of reproductive choice information 
and uses judicial precedent to show how clinicians can face 
substantial liability if they fail to return reproductive risks. In 
many cases, courts have found this failure to violate the abor-
tion right. Part III provides a legal and policy framework that 
supports private return of reproductive risks to adolescents in-
dividually in the clinical setting, as well as sharing general 
knowledge of reproductive choice information and genomics via 
sex education programs.19 In arguing for the importance of 
knowing reproductive choice information, this Note aims to 
promote conditions that equip individuals to contribute to de-
creasing the prevalence of birth defects. 
 
 18. E.g., Sherree Kassuba, Environmental Causes of Birth Defects, YALE-
NEW HAVEN TEACHERS INST., http://teachersinstitute.yale.edu/curriculum/ 
units/1982/7/82.07.07.x.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (detailing a unit on 
birth defects designed for ninth grade students). 
 19. Cf. Jayne Lucke, Better Sex Education for Young People Is a Public 
Health Solution to the Problem of Advanced Maternal Age, 15 AM. J. BIOETH-
ICS 58 (2015) (recommending to promote reproductive choice by discussing the 
risks of infertility associated with advanced maternal age in sex education 
programs). 
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I.  GENOMICS AND ADOLESCENT REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS   
Genomic sequencing will be the backbone of healthcare’s 
turn to precision medicine. Indeed, the “dramatic drop”20 in the 
cost of sequencing over the past few years was a catalyst for the 
Precision Medicine Initiative, announced in President Obama’s 
2015 State of the Union Address.21 Though there is debate as to 
whether personalized medicine will increase or decrease 
healthcare costs, if the latter is to be possible, a public health 
perspective is imperative to create the data to support genomic 
healthcare.22 With NIH-funded initiatives underway that are 
exploring the benefits of routine newborn genomic screening, 
genomics is being “rapidly introduced into pediatric clinical 
practice.”23 Additionally, the availability of several direct-to-
consumer (DTC) genetic tests have expanded testing outside 
hospitals and clinics; since 2008, people could submit a hun-
dred dollars and a sample of saliva via mail to learn about their 
risks of developing “everything from macular degeneration to 
restless leg syndrome.”24 
This Part provides a background that shows how adoles-
cent reproductive rights will be implicated as precision medi-
cine and genomics become part of standard clinical practice. 
The first Section explains how parents have rights to determine 
their child’s healthcare decisions and access the child’s health 
information. These presumptive rights begin before their future 
 
 20. Rita Rubin, Precision Medicine: The Future or Simply Politics?, 313 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1089, 1089 (2015). 
 21. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Ad-
dress (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/ 
remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015 (stating that the Ini-
tiative would “give all of us access to the personalized information we need to 
keep ourselves and our families healthier”). 
 22. Muin Khoury et al., Beyond Base Pairs to Bedside: A Population Per-
spective on How Genomics Can Improve Health, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 34, 
36 (2012) (“[O]nly a population perspective can fulfill the promise of genomic 
medicine.”); see also Muin Khoury, The Public Health Approach to Genetic 
Testing in the 21st Century: Saving Lives and Saving Unnecessary Healthcare 
Costs, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION GENOMICS & HEALTHCARE IM-
PACT (Mar. 15, 2012), http://blogs.cdc.gov/genomics/2012/03/15/the-public 
-health-approach-to-genetic-testing (“[A] public health approach to genomic 
medicine is essential if the new technology is to be used in a way that saves 
lives and saves healthcare costs at the same time.”). 
 23. McCullough et al., supra note 15, at e974. 
 24. Ricki Lewis, A Brief History of Genetic Testing: What the First Genera-
tion of Tests Can Tell Us About the Latest, SCI. PROGRESS (May 5, 2008), 
http://scienceprogress.org/2008/05/a-brief-history-of-genetic-testing. 
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child is born and continue until the child reaches adulthood. 
The second Section introduces the recommendations of promi-
nent medical organizations regarding returning genomic re-
sults to minors. These organizations recommend returning a 
child’s results to parents rather than directly to the child. 
A. PARENTAL VIS-À-VIS MINOR RIGHTS TO REPRODUCTIVE 
HEALTHCARE 
As sequencing capabilities have been improved and re-
fined, and as they have dramatically dropped in price,25 more 
individuals have been able to access their genomic results in 
clinical settings and at home, through DTC testing companies 
like 23andMe, Full Genomes, Gene by Gene, Sure Genomics, 
and YSEQ.26 In the clinical context, prenatal and neonatal se-
quencing raise especial concerns about what rights, if any, ado-
lescents have with respect to genomic testing and return of 
testing results. DTC options lacking established clinical validi-
ty exacerbate these issues, for parents (or a minor with access 
to a credit card) can access these options outside the physician-
adolescent relationship.27 
This Section shows how parents presumptively have full 
control over their children’s health information. The first Sub-
section explains how federal abortion jurisprudence protects a 
woman’s right to have unrestricted access to her child’s ge-
nomic information throughout her pregnancy. The next shows 
how both parents additionally have virtually unlimited access 
to their child’s genomic information in infancy and childhood. 
The third Subsection describes how the presumption of paren-
tal control begins to shift in adolescence, with federal and state 
laws granting minors rights to access reproductive services pri-
vately from parents, to obtain their own health information, 
 
 25. Rubin, supra note 20. 
 26. 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2016); FULL 
GENOMES DNA SEQUENCING, https://www.fullgenomes.com (last visited Nov. 
1, 2016); GENE BY GENE, https://www.genebygene.com (last visited Nov. 1, 
2016); SURE GENOMICS, http://suregenomics.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2016); 
YSEQ DNA ORIGINS PROJECT, http://yseq.net (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
 27. 23andMe’s privacy statement, for example, implies the benefits of di-
rect-to-consumer genomic testing can extend to children as early as age thir-
teen. Full Privacy Statement, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/ 
-privacy (last updated Sept. 29, 2016) (“Neither 23andMe nor any of its Ser-
vices are designed for, intended to attract, or directed toward children under 
the age of 13.”). 
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and to refuse genetic and genomic testing if they do not want it 
done. 
1. Parental Rights To Obtain a Child’s Genomic Results in 
Utero 
To understand the lack of control minors have over their 
genomic information, it is crucial to consider federal and state 
abortion law as a backdrop. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court 
recognized abortion as a woman’s constitutional right.28 Revisit-
ing that holding two decades later in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, Justice O’Connor provided the undue burden test as an 
alternative to Roe’s strict scrutiny analysis, recognizing that 
“there is a substantial state interest in potential life” not only 
post-viability (as was the case under Roe) but throughout a 
pregnancy.29 The Court held in Casey that abortion restrictions 
that are “unduly burdensome” will be struck down as unconsti-
tutional.30 Under Casey’s analysis, “[a] burden may be ‘undue’ 
either because [it] is too severe or because it lacks a legitimate, 
rational justification.”31 
Thus, under federal abortion jurisprudence—which the 
Supreme Court updated for the first time since 2007 in Whole 
Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt32—it is unclear whether a state 
could ever deny a woman from using an available prenatal test. 
Sequenom’s MaterniT 21, for instance, is a non-invasive fetal 
sequencing option commercially available since 2011 that de-
tects Down syndrome, among other trisomies and mutations.33 
This reproductive choice information enables women to choose 
whether or not to continue their pregnancies after diagnosis. 
Congress and roughly half of state legislatures have considered 
bills in the past few years seeking to prohibit abortions to select 
against the fetus’s sex, race, or health, thus not prohibiting fe-
tal testing per se but rather the abortions that may ensue.34 
 
 28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 29. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992). 
 30. Id. at 874. 
 31. Id. at 920 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 32. The Court upheld Casey’s undue burden standard, holding that a Tex-
as law requiring doctors who preform abortions to have admitting privileges at 
a local hospital did not serve a legitimate state interest. Whole Women’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2311–13 (2016). 
 33. MaterniT21 Plus, SEQUENOM, https://laboratories.sequenom.com/ 
test/reproductive-health/maternit21-plus (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
 34. E.g., Assemb. B. 2336, 2013–2104 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); S.B. 
2790, 129th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2014); H.B. 1585, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d 
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Though it may seem that such laws would overstep Casey’s 
“undue burden” standard, North Dakota has had such a ban in 
force since 2013,35 and Indiana has had one on the books since 
March 2016.36 
One justification states could assert for denying access to 
genetic testing is that this promotes the state’s interest in fetal 
life, since studies have shown for decades that women will be 
more likely to obtain an abortion if they learn of a fetal abnor-
mality than if they never had such information.37 States could 
also argue such testing makes selective, expressively discrimi-
natory abortions possible because of the fetus’s sex or genetic 
status; such laws might have a rational, legitimate connection 
to a state interest in protecting the civil rights of the unborn.38 
 
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014); H.B. 4034, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2014); 
H.B. 7383, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2014); S.B. 2376, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(R.I. 2014); H.B. 98, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); H.B. 2371, 81st Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014); H.B. 1131, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 
2013); S.B. 56, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); H.B. 845, 115th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); S.B. 1072, 115th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); H.B. 
1430, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013); S.B. 183, 118th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013); S. File 13, 85th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2013); 
H.B. 1567, 188th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013); Assemb. B. 2533, 236th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); S.B. 2286, 236th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); H.B. 309, 
83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013); Assemb. B. 217, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 
2014); S.B. 201, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014); H.B. 5731, 96th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Mich. 2012); Assemb. B. 2157, 215th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2012); 
H.B. 570, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012); H.B. 1155, 2009–2010 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010); S.B. 529, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010); 
H.B. 693, 60th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010); H. File 1196, 86th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Minn. 2009); S. File 1073, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2009). 
 35. N.D. CENT. CODE, § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013). 
 36. Tribune News Serv., Indiana Governor Oks Fetal Defects Abortion 
Ban, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ 
nationworld/midwest/ct-indiana-abortion-ban-genetic-abnormalities-20160324 
-story.html. 
 37. See Tamsen Caruso et al., Impact of Prenatal Screening on the Birth 
Status of Fetuses with Down Syndrome at an Urban Hospital, 1972-1994, 1 
GENET. MED. 22 (1998); Mathias Forrester & Ruth Merz, Epidemiology of 
Down Syndrome, 65 TERATOLOGY 207 (2002); Ralph Kramer et al., Determi-
nants of Parental Decisions After the Prenatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome, 
79 AM. J. MED. GENET. 172 (1998); Caroline Mansfield et al., Termination 
Rates After Prenatal Diagnosis for Down Syndrome, Spina Bifida, Anenceph-
aly, and Turner and Klinefelter Syndromes: A Systematic Literature Review, 
19 PRENAT. DIAGN. 808 (1999); Jaime Natoli et al., Prenatal Diagnosis of 
Down Syndrome: A Systematic Review of Termination Rates (1995-2011), 32 
PRENAT. DIAGN. 142 (2012). 
 38. See Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglas Prenatal Discrimination 
Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 3541 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Rep. Trent 
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One might argue denying in utero testing cannot be unduly 
burdensome because it does not affect the legality of or access 
to abortion. This is unlikely given the Supreme Court’s articu-
lation of abortion as falling within a woman’s liberty rights. As 
the Court remarked in Casey, decisions whether or not to ter-
minate a pregnancy are “choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, [and] are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment,”39 which includes a woman’s autono-
my to “determine her life’s course”40 and exercise “control over 
her destiny”41 by opting to terminate the pregnancy. Thus, even 
if a state can posit a legitimate interest in discouraging post-
diagnosis abortions, a prohibition on in utero testing could be 
found unconstitutionally burdensome for violating the woman’s 
decisional autonomy regarding her abortion choice. Indeed, 
Planned Parenthood recently filed suit to enjoin Indiana’s ab-
normality-selective abortion ban from going into effect.42 One 
upshot of these considerations concerning the nature of in utero 
testing as a liberty found within the abortion right, in sum, is 
that parents can have unrestricted access to their child’s ge-
nomic information prior to birth.43 
2. Parental Rights To Obtain a Child’s Genomic Results in 
Infancy and Childhood 
From the in utero context to state-run newborn screening 
to testing in infancy and early childhood, the child whose 
health information is obtained has virtually no rights for that 
information to be kept private from parents.44 In addition to the 
possibility of prenatal testing, genetic results are routinely ob-
tained shortly after birth, as is the case in the newborn screen-
ing programs mandated by law in all fifty states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, except Wyoming.45 These programs identify 
 
Franks) (describing the Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act). 
 39. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 40. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing). 
 41. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.  
 42. Emma Green, Indiana Tried To Raise Ethical Challenges to Abortion, 
but Will Probably Fail, THE ATLANTIC (July 1, 2016), http://www.theatlantic 
.com/politics/archive/2016/07/indiana-tried-to-raise-ethical-challenges-to 
-abortion-but-will-probably-fail/489746. 
 43. Clayton, supra note 17, at 540. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Michelle Huckaby Lewis & Aaron Goldberg, Return of Results from 
Researching Using Newborn Screening Dried Blood Samples, 43 J.L. MED. 
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roughly 12,500 children annually with metabolic, endocrine, 
hematologic, or functional disorders.46 If clinically significant 
results arise, state laboratories notify clinicians, who relay the 
information to parents to enable them to seek diagnostic con-
firmation.47 Prevailing medical guidelines are to return to par-
ents diagnoses and risk assessments for conditions that are life 
threatening or can be ameliorated only in childhood.48 The Na-
tional Institute of Child Health and Human Development is 
now exploring the possibility of newborn genomic screening 
programs.49 Several state statutes explicitly grant parents con-
trol over their child’s newborn screening results.50 If a child ex-
hibits symptoms of an undiagnosed condition in infancy and 
early childhood, parents might have further reason to gain ac-
cess to the child’s genomic information. Beyond early childhood, 
genomic testing of children is uncommon.51 
3. Genetic Testing and Reproductive Rights in Adolescence 
Legal and ethical issues concerning pediatric sequencing 
become more complex in later childhood, adolescence, and near-
adulthood, as unemancipated minors become more capable of 
comprehending and making decisions in light of their personal 
health information. In these contexts, questions arise concern-
ing the extent to which the broadly protected rights of parents 
to choose how to raise their children—among the earliest of 
substantive due process rights52—allow them to control the mi-
nor’s healthcare. It is possible that this permission for parents 
to control their children’s healthcare can run into tension with 
 
ETHICS 559, 560 (2015). 
 46. Id. 
 47. McCullough et al., supra note 15, at e979. 
 48. Id. at e978. 
 49. NIH Program Explores the Use of Genomic Sequencing in Newborn 
Healthcare, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.nih.gov/news 
-events/news-releases/nih-program-explores-use-genomic-sequencing-newborn 
-healthcare. 
 50. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124980 (2015); N.H. STAT. 
§ 132:10a (2015); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33.0111 (2015). 
 51. Ross et al., supra note 15, at 234. 
 52. E.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding a law 
requiring children’s attendance at public schools unconstitutional because it 
interfered with parental rights to “direct the upbringing” of their children); 
Meier v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (finding a law restricting foreign-
language education to violate parents’ rights to choose their children’s educa-
tion, a right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). 
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the heightened legal protections accorded to adolescent repro-
ductive services and information in other (non-genomic) con-
texts. This Section describes federal and state laws giving ado-
lescents private access to reproductive services, protections for 
keeping adolescent reproductive information secure, and pro-
fessional guidelines concerning adolescent rights to refuse ge-
netic and genomic testing. 
a. Protections for Adolescent Access to Reproductive Services 
A first set of exceptions to the presumption of parental con-
trol over the healthcare of their children concerns the minor’s 
right to access services related to their reproductive choices 
privately from parents. Supreme Court precedent regarding 
adolescent reproductive rights came in the wake of decisions 
finding a privacy right to access contraception within the Con-
stitution’s “penumbras” and “emanations,”53 as well as in the 
wake of Roe’s recognition of the abortion right. In Carey v. Pop-
ulation Services International, the Supreme Court recognized 
that minors possess constitutional rights to obtain non-
prescription contraceptives without parental consent.54 In 
Bellotti v. Baird, the Court also extended to minors a right to 
obtain abortion services without parental consent, though 
states can require judicial approval in lieu of it.55 The Court re-
frained from extending Roe’s full protection to minors, stressing 
their “inability to make critical decisions in an informed and 
mature manner and the importance of the parental role in child 
rearing.”56 
Federal and state statutory law also promotes the abilities 
of adolescents to access services related to their reproductive 
choices privately from parents. The family planning program 
established in 1970 under Title X of the Public Health and 
Safety Act provides federal funds for family planning clinics to 
provide low-income patients with services “including natural 
family planning methods, infertility services, and services for 
adolescents”; in the case of adolescents, providers must encour-
 
 53. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see also Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it 
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”). 
 54. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 697–99 (1977). 
 55. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
 56. Id. at 634. 
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age but cannot require family involvement.57 Additionally, all 
states have statutes permitting minors access to certain clinical 
services without parental permission, such as services related 
to sexual activity, drug and alcohol abuse, and mental health.58 
The majority of states have explicit statutory authorizations for 
pregnant minors to obtain prenatal and delivery services with-
out parental notification or consent, and state “lawmakers have 
generally resisted attempts to impose a parental consent or no-
tification requirement on minors’ access to reproductive health 
care and other sensitive services.”59 
b. Protections for Adolescent Access to Reproductive 
Information 
In addition to these protections for adolescents to access 
healthcare services and products like contraception, abortion 
and counseling, federal and state laws also provide an excep-
tion to the presumption of parental control over an adolescent’s 
right to access health information. Under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), “protected health 
information” is defined as “individually identifiable” health in-
formation,60 where “health information” is any oral or recorded 
information “created or received by a health care provider”61 
and “relates to . . . the provision of health care to an individu-
al.”62 
Parental rights under HIPAA are covered in the section on 
personal representatives.63 That section states that “if under 
[the] applicable law [a person] has authority to act on behalf of 
. . . an unemancipated minor in making decisions related to 
health care, a covered entity must treat such person as a per-
sonal representative.”64 At the same time, HIPAA states that, 
with regard to protected health information pertaining to a 
 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (2012). 
 58. See ABIGAIL ENGLISH ET AL., STATE MINOR CONSENT LAWS: A SUM-
MARY (3d ed. 2010) (summarizing the laws in each of the fifty U.S. states and 
the District of Columbia that allow minors to give their own consent for health 
care). 
 59. Heather Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, Minors and the Right To Consent 
to Healthcare, 3 GUTTMACHER REP. PUB. POL’Y 4, 4 (2000). 
 60. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014). 
 61. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 § 1171(4)(A) (1996). 
 62. Id. § 1171(4)(B). 
 63. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g) (2013). 
 64. Id. § 164.502(g)(2) (emphasis added). 
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healthcare service, parents “may” not be representatives when 
“minor[s] may obtain such services lawfully without parental 
consent.”65 In other words, HIPAA requires that parents be 
treated as representatives who act on behalf of their child in 
making healthcare decisions, unless there is judicial prece-
dent—such as Carey and Bellotti, or other applicable federal or 
state laws giving the minor rights to access healthcare without 
parental involvement. 
c. Adolescent Rights To Refuse Testing 
Lastly, concerning not the right to access but the minor’s 
right to refuse genetic and genomic testing, “unemancipated 
minors have virtually no access to the courts to enjoin parental 
behavior.”66 In part, this is because of the wide latitude granted 
to parents in choosing how to raise their children.67 It is also 
because child protection agencies would be unlikely to inter-
vene to uphold a minor’s refusal to be tested because, absent a 
risk of serious harm to the child, non-invasive testing cannot 
qualify as neglect or abuse.68 Still, physicians have discretion to 
refuse parental wishes if they deem them to be “inappropriate” 
for the child,69 which could plausibly include obtaining samples 
for sequencing from a teenager who expressly does not want it 
done. Indeed, professional ethical standards are that clinicians 
should not perform testing on minors who object if they are 
“older school-age children.”70 Though the physician’s assess-
ment of appropriateness could initially parry parental rights, 
the riposte is that parents are free to find another clinician 
willing to perform such tests in these situations, and, as dis-
cussed, they are free to have the child’s genome sequenced in 
utero. 
 
 65. Id. § 164.502(g)(3)(i)(B). 
 66. Clayton, supra note 17, at 540. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Arthur Kohrman et al., Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and 
Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 317 (1995) (issuing a state-
ment by the American Academy of Pediatricians that older-age children “fre-
quently have decision-making capacity and the legal authority to accept or re-
ject interventions, and, in that event, no additional requirement to obtain 
parental permission exists. However, the Academy encourages parental in-
volvement in such cases, as appropriate”). 
 70. Id. at 316; see also Am. Acad. Pediatrics, AAP Publications Reaffirmed 
and Retired, 130 PEDIATRICS e467 (2012) (reaffirming ethical standards on as-
sent for older minors). 
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In sum, this Part has thus far shown how minors have le-
gal protection for some aspects of their sexual and reproductive 
information. Protections exist for information generated 
through services they access in the clinical setting, and even 
records from school health services.71 However, there are no 
protections for reproductive information generated by services 
accessed by their parents. Yet this is precisely the problem cre-
ated by pediatric genomics: it is not a health service that ado-
lescents can access on their own but rather an option their par-
ents may elect for, generating large amounts of the child’s 
health information when the child is too young to consent or is 
not yet born. As such, current laws are inadequate to protect an 
adolescent’s reproductive choice information in a genomic age. 
B. MEDICAL VIEWS ON RETURN OF GENOMIC REPRODUCTIVE 
INFORMATION TO MINORS 
Federal laws such as HIPAA and Title X of the PHSA, 
state laws, and contraception and abortion jurisprudence are 
not the only sources of guidelines for returning results of re-
productive significance to minors. Rather, there is an extensive 
literature on best practices for returning results of “reproduc-
tive significance,”72 in both clinical73 and research settings.74 
 
 71. A student’s school health records at the elementary and secondary 
levels are considered “education records” under FERPA, thereby releasable to 
parents. They can be kept private from parents only if the student is over 
eighteen or attends a postsecondary institution. See Family Education Rights 
and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., JOINT GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 
FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY ACT (FERPA) AND THE HEALTH 
INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 (HIPAA) TO STU-
DENT HEALTH RECORDS 1 (2008). 
 72. E.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICS ISSUES, 
ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE: ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTAL AND 
SECONDARY FINDINGS IN THE CLINICAL, RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TO-
CONSUMER CONTEXTS 79–89 (2013) (discussing clinical and research duties 
regarding results of “reproductive significance”). See generally Diane 
Korngiebel et al., Generating a Taxonomy for Genetic Conditions Relevant to 
Reproductive Planning, 170A AM. J. MED. GENETICS 565 (2016) (researching 
best practices and ethical concerns in sharing reproductive planning results); 
Michael Leo et al., Patients’ Ratings of Genetic Conditions Validate a Taxono-
my To Simplify Decisions About Preconception Carrier Screening via Genome 
Sequencing, 170A AM. J. MED. GENETICS 574 (2016) (exploring which types of 
genetic testing information parents want to know in their reproductive plan-
ning).  
 73. See Lisa Parker, The Future of Incidental Findings: Should They Be 
Viewed as Benefits?, 36 J.L. MED. ETHICS 341, 342 (2008); Benjamin Wilfond & 
Katrina Goddard, It’s Complicated: Criteria for Policy Decisions for the Clini-
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Additionally, though the plaintiffs have typically been adults, 
neonatal torts can be another source of guidelines for protecting 
the right to know reproductive choice information in adoles-
cence. 
This Section develops an exception to the presumption of 
parental control over an adolescent’s reproductive choice infor-
mation. The first Subsection introduces recent guidelines by in-
fluential professional organizations detailing a clinician’s duty 
of care when genomic sequencing reveals an adolescent’s “re-
productive risks.” The second Subsection discusses the variety 
of prenatal torts that can be brought against clinicians and 
others for failing to warn individuals about their reproductive 
risks. 
1. Medical Views on Genomics in Adolescence: An Exception 
for Reproductive Risks 
Prominent medical organizations are supportive of pediat-
ric sequencing in a number of circumstances. The American 
College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG) and Ameri-
can Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) issued a joint policy state-
ment in 2013 in which they supported the initiation of pediatric 
genomic testing if parents know of a family history of a muta-
tion, but the organizations otherwise do not favor pre-
symptomatic sequencing.75 In a separate policy statement it is-
sued the same year, the ACMG recommended that when par-
 
cal Integration of Genome-Scale Sequencing for Reproductive Decision Making, 
3 MOLECULAR GENETIC & GENOMIC MED. 239, 239–40 (2015).  
 74. Robert Klitzman et al., Researcher’s Views on Returning Incidental 
Genomic Research Results: Qualitative and Quantitative Findings, 15 GENET-
ICS MED. 888, 888 (2013); Susan Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings 
and Research Results in Genomic Research Involving Biobanks and Archived 
Data Sets, 14 GENETICS MED. 361, 373 (2012) (“[We] suggest[ ] that findings of 
reproductive importance should fall in the ‘may return’ category.”); see also 
Denise Avard et al., Pediatric Research and the Return of Individual Research 
Results, 39 J.L. MED. ETHICS 593, 599 (2011) (“In some circumstances, re-
search results will reveal the carrier status of the child. Carrier status should 
generally not be communicated to parents because it has no implications for 
the immediate future health of the child, but rather should be provided when 
the adolescent begins to consider his or her reproductive health.”); Susan Wolf 
et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Analysis 
and Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. ETHICS 219, 229 (2008) (“Including 
among researcher duties an obligation to offer to disclose to participants [in-
formation of ] . . . reproductive importance is consistent not only with legal 
recognition of researchers’ special obligations toward participants, but also 
with legal doctrine imposing a duty to warn of foreseeable harm.”). 
 75. Ross et al., supra note 15. 
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ents obtain pediatric whole genome or exome sequencing in 
search of a primary indication, incidental findings should be re-
turned to parents if they reveal conditions that are early onset, 
life threatening, or necessitate ameliorative measures in child-
hood.76 The ACMG initially stated in this recommendation that 
parents should not be permitted to opt out of the analysis of in-
cidental findings.77 However, after criticism on this point,78 the 
organization released a policy update in 2014 permitting par-
ents to opt out of the analysis.79 
In addition to returning results to parents, the ACMG and 
AAP support returning incidental findings of reproductive risks 
to minors, as does the NIH’s Clinical Sequencing Exploratory 
Research Pediatric Working Group (CSER-PWG).80 The ACMG 
and AAP do not support screening in the school context, but 
they suggest clinical carrier screening may be appropriate for 
adolescents who are “pregnant or considering reproduction.”81 
They claim the benefits of clinical carrier screening can “in-
clude potentially greater acceptance and integration of status 
into life plans, avoidance of the shock and resentment that may 
accrue when disclosure is delayed, and greater opportunity for 
parental guidance,” and “reproductive benefits include avoiding 
the birth of a child with genetic disease or having time to pre-
pare for the birth of a child with genetic disease.”82 
Meanwhile, CSER-PWG maintains that pediatricians have 
a “prima facie, autonomy-based ethical obligation to provide 
adolescent patients, ideally before they become sexually active, 
with reproductive risk assessment results.”83 However, minors 
 
 76. Robert Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Inci-
dental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS 
MED. 565, 568 (2013). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Wylie Burke et al., Recommendations for Returning Genomic Inci-
dental Findings? We Need To Talk!, 15 GENETICS MED. 854, 857 (2013). 
 79. Am. Coll. Med. Genetics & Genomics, ACMG Updates Recommenda-
tion on “Opt Out” for Genomic Sequencing Return of Results, ACMG NEWS 
(Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.acmg.net/docs/Release_ 
ACMGUpdatesRecommendations_final.pdf. 
 80. McCullough et al., supra note 15, at e979. 
 81. Ross et al., supra note 15, at 237; see also Jennifer Schneider et al., “Is 
It Worth Knowing?”: Focus Group Participants’ Perceived Utility of Genomic 
Preconception Carrier Screening, 25 J. GENETIC COUNS. 135, 135 (2016) (not-
ing a mixture of “certain” and “hesitant” participants with respect to interest 
in obtaining genomic carrier screening results). 
 82. Ross et al., supra note 15, at 237. 
 83. McCullough et al., supra note 15, at e978. 
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should be permitted “to refuse to learn or to act on the results 
of reproductive risk assessment.”84 In agreement with the 
ACMG’s 2014 update permitting parents to opt out, CSER-
PWG contends that parents do not violate a prima facie ethical 
obligation to their child by choosing not to tell the child of non-
life-threatening incidental findings.85 The recommendations of 
these organizations, in other words, is that it would be benefi-
cial to analyze and return reproductive risks to minors, but this 
is ultimately the parent’s decision. 
2. Neonatal Torts and the Clinician’s Reasons To Mitigate 
Liability Risks: A Problem with Medical Recommendations 
The ACMG and CSER-PWG recommendations are valua-
ble, particularly because they emphasize that there are good 
reasons to encourage knowledge of reproductive risks before an 
individual becomes sexually active. This Subsection argues that 
these recommendations do not, however, account sufficiently 
for the risks clinicians face from neonatal litigation—a problem 
created because they do not recommend returning genomic re-
productive choice information directly to minors.86 
The ACMG and CSER-PWG recommendation that parents 
should have control over their child’s reproductive choice in-
formation is problematic because parents are not subject to lia-
bility for failing to disclose these risks to their children.87 By 
contrast, clinicians, other medical personnel (such as ultrasono-
graphers), and non-medical personnel (such as pharmaceutical 
companies) in most states can face substantial liability from 
wrongful life, wrongful birth, wrongful conception, or even 
wrongful death causes of action that could be brought for fail-
ing to warn minors of their reproductive risks.88 Namely, clini-
cians can be liable if a court finds such a failure to be the prox-
imate cause of a patient having a child with birth defects, when 
the patient otherwise would have avoided conception or would 
have aborted.89 
In Molloy v. Meier, for example, a couple filed a claim 
against three doctors asserting they were negligent for failing 
 
 84. Id. at e979. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See notes 75–85 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Carel Stolker, Wrongful Life: The Limits of Liability and Beyond, 
43 INTL & COMP. L.Q. 521, 534 (1994). 
 88. Id. at 521. 
 89. Id. at 527. 
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to diagnose Fragile X syndrome in the couple’s first child.90 The 
parents sought damages for the birth of a second child with the 
condition, asserting they would have obtained a tubal ligation if 
they had known; that fact characterized it as a “wrongful con-
ception” cause of action.91 The Minnesota Supreme Court found 
that the doctors had breached duties of care both to the second 
child with Fragile X and also her parents.92 The court found 
that, in the course of treating their first child, the doctor should 
have alerted the parents of the “high probability” their future 
children would be born with the syndrome.93 Since the parents 
would have obtained a tubal ligation, the court found that the 
cause of action and damages accrued at conception.94 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Molloy recognized that 
doctors had breached a duty to the second child; this is curious 
because Minnesota has a statutory prohibition on “wrongful 
life” lawsuits.95 In that type of action, the suit is brought by or 
on behalf of the child, seeking damages as compensation for be-
ing born with a condition such as Fragile X as the result of an-
other party’s negligence. Molloy is puzzling because the court 
found the doctor had breached a duty to a party that was pro-
hibited from seeking legal compensation for that breach. In the 
1960s, plaintiffs seeking compensation for being born “adulter-
ine bastard[s]” brought the first wrongful life cases that arose 
against parents.96 Post-Roe, many of these suits had the new 
component that the parents would have exercised the abortion 
right, rather than never conceived, if doctors had warned them 
of a reproductive risk. On several occasions, for instance, cases 
were brought on behalf of an infant with congenital rubella 
syndrome by parents asserting they were unaware that the 
mother’s contraction of the German measles created this repro-
ductive risk. In one such case, the infant plaintiff ’s mother 
stated in her deposition that “I would have done the kindest 
 
 90. 679 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Minn. 2004). 
 91. Id. at 716. 
 92. Id. at 719. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 722. 
 95. MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (2002). 
 96. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963); see also 
Williams v. State, 223 N.E.2d 343 (N.Y. 1966) (dismissing a claim that the 
State was negligent in allowing a hospitalized mother to give birth out of wed-
lock). 
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thing that I could have known to have done for her, and that 
would have been to terminate the pregnancy.”97 
State legislatures and courts have reacted negatively to the 
wrongful life cause of action, with all but six prohibiting it by 
statute or judicial decision.98 By contrast, though, roughly half 
of states recognize “wrongful birth” claims, which enable par-
ents to recover for their harm in not having the opportunity to 
make an informed abortion decision because of a doctor’s fail-
ure to return reproductive risks.99 There have been numerous 
wrongful birth suits, some in which parents have recovered 
eight-figure settlements against medical personnel and institu-
tions.100 In comparison, there have been fewer than 200 wrong-
ful life cases.101 Still, plaintiffs have successfully recovered in at 
least a dozen of those, with the most commonly litigated and 
recovered condition being Down syndrome (also the most com-
mon birth defect102), for which the average settlement award is 
$734,639.103 Others include a New York case in which 
$3,837,477 was recovered on behalf of an infant who was con-
fined for the rest of his life to a hospital with multiple severe 
defects.104 In that case, the plaintiff ’s mother underwent three 
 
 97. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1975). 
 98. Deborah Pergament & Katie Ilijic, The Legal Past, Present and Future 
of Prenatal Genetic Testing: Professional Liability and Other Legal Challenges 
Affecting Patient Access to Service, 3 J. CLINICAL MED. 1437, 1445 (2014). 
 99. For a systematic overview of statutory responses to wrongful life suits, 
see William Duncan, Statutory Responses to “Wrongful Birth” and “Wrongful 
Life” Actions, U. FAC. FOR LIFE, http://www.uffl.org/Vol14/Duncan-04.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
 100. See, e.g., Carol M. Ostrom, $50M Awarded over Birth Defect; Test Said 
Baby Would Be Okay, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.seattletimes 
.com/seattle-news/50-m-awarded-over-birth-defect-test-said-baby-would-be 
-okay. 
 101. This figure comes from the author’s own research. After reviewing 
roughly 1200 cases from 1963 up until 2016, there have been roughly 150 cas-
es since the first case, depending on how one defines the “wrongful life” cause 
of action 
 102. Birth Defects: Data and Statistics, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/birthdefects/data.html (last updated 
June 22, 2015). 
 103. J.C. v. Health Partners Med. Grp., No. BC394518, 2009 Jury Verdicts 
LEXIS 446678 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2009); Olivares ex rel. G.O. v. L.A. Med. Ctr., 
No. BC352486, 2008 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 57175 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2008); Un-
named Father ex rel. Unnamed Minor v. Unnamed Hosp., 2008 WL 747741 
(Cal. Super. Ct. 2008); Confidential (S99-07-16), 1998 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 
72413 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1998). 
 104. Branca v. Miro, No. 0735/01, 2004 NY Jury Verdicts Review LEXIS 
823 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
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ultrasounds, all of which she was told were normal.105 Discovery 
revealed that the ultrasonographer has signaled a “red flag” to 
the defendant doctor, which he neglected to convey to the plain-
tiff ’s mother.106 The negligence claim also asserted the defend-
ant gave her advice not to have an alpha-fetoprotein (AFP) test 
done, and she opted not to have the test done in reliance on 
that advice.107 A case of congenital chicken pox, also involving 
multiple severe defects, settled for $3,325,000.108 There have 
been seven-figure settlements for a failure to warn about re-
productive risks for other congenital conditions as well, such as 
cystic fibrosis.109 
In sum, this Part first showed how U.S. laws create a pre-
sumption of parental control over their child’s healthcare, but 
an exception is carved out in adolescence for information and 
services germane to the adolescent’s reproductive choices. It 
then discussed pertinent medical recommendations on ge-
nomics in adolescence, bringing two lines of criticism against 
them. First, these recommendations provide inadequate protec-
tion for the reproductive rights of adolescents. Second, they fail 
to reflect the clinician’s full duty of care in this context, with 
neonatal torts helping to sketch a better picture of that duty. 
II.  REASONS TO PROMOTE ADOLESCENT PRIVACY AND 
KNOWLEDGE OF REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 
INFORMATION   
Part I argued that while adolescents have protections for 
the privacy of their reproductive choice information and access 
to reproductive healthcare services, there are few state and no 
federal laws extending these protections to genomic results. 
This is a significant gap because, with the exception of target-
enrichment methods of sequencing,110 whole genome or exome 
sequencing is not targeted; information about reproductive 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Toth-Lewis ex rel. B.T.L. v. Walden, No. BC391854, 2010 Jury Ver-
dicts LEXIS 51458 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2010). 
 109. Confidential v. Confidential OB/GYN, 2010 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 5322 
(2010) (claiming that the failure of a doctor to inform the mother in her first, 
miscarried pregnancy that she was a carrier for cystic fibrosis resulted in her 
husband not being tested and a second child being born with the disorder). 
 110. See, e.g., Stavros Bashiadres et al., Direct Genomic Selection, 2 NA-
TURE METHODS 63 (2005) (studying genetic variants by targeting specific ge-
nomic regions). 
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risks and other gene variants will inevitably be revealed by se-
quencing if those variants exist. A healthcare regime in which 
sequencing is routine must grapple with what to do with such 
secondary, incidental findings, especially when they reveal re-
productive choice information. This Part analyzes the reasons 
to withhold and reasons to return results to adolescents and 
concludes that in the case of genomic results of reproductive 
significance, there are greater reasons to return than to with-
hold. 
A. POTENTIAL REASONS TO WITHHOLD CATEGORICAL RESULTS 
FROM ADOLESCENTS 
Despite the benefits of informing adolescent reproductive 
choices with genomic information, one reason not to return re-
sults is that knowledge of one’s genetic or genomic information 
could induce unwanted anxiety. Brian Hurley, for example, 
learned from his ophthalmologist at age thirteen that at some 
point in his life, he would go blind from retinitis pigmentosa.111 
“It was like having a time bomb inside of me,” he remarked 
about the prognosis.112 His vision did steadily deteriorate after 
college, and he had lost the majority of his eyesight by the time 
he was thirty-three.113 “The irony,” he concluded, “is the antici-
pation was much worse than the actual loss. It was a relief to 
stop worrying about when the loss would occur.”114 Though this 
may reflect the experiences of some, systematic reviews have 
found “insufficient evidence to inform a nuanced understanding 
of how children respond to genetic testing.”115 
Public health concerns may also counsel against return of 
results to the extent that knowledge of one’s genomic infor-
mation reinforces unhealthy life choices that produce a public 
burden. For example, public health genomic policies could at-
tempt to identify genotypes that modulate smoking status, ini-
 
 111. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICS ISSUES, PRIVACY 
AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOMIC SEQUENCING 23 (2012). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 22. 
 114. Id. at 23. 
 115. Andrea Patenaude, Save the Children: Direct-to-Consumer Testing of 
Children Is Premature, Even for Research, 36 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 1122, 
1124 (2011); see also Katherine James et al., Impact of Direct-to-Consumer 
Predictive Genomic Testing on Risk Perception and Worry Among Patients Re-
ceiving Routine Care in a Preventive Health Clinic, 86 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 933 
(2011) (suggesting that patients receiving predicting genomic risk information 
does not necessarily influence risk assessment or level of worry). 
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tiation, cessation, and treatments.116 While using such an initi-
ative to identify individuals who have a high susceptibility to 
cancer may motivate them to quit, it may also “enable[] those 
who are unsuccessful in quitting to blame genetic factors, 
which would thereby decrease motivation.”117 Facilitating such 
genetic fatalism affects the public interest not only because of 
smoking-related disabilities, but also because the testing itself 
would be an inefficient use of resources if it did not result in 
changing individual behavior. Further, inasmuch as knowledge 
of one’s genetic information can cause anxiety about one’s 
health,118 the predictive, prognostic role of genomics (its role in 
providing risk assessments rather than diagnoses) could con-
tribute to unnecessary surveillance and further testing.119 
An appropriate policy for return of results to minors should 
be cognizant of such potential negative psychological responses 
to knowing one’s genomic information, as well as the limited 
abilities of adolescents to make well-informed, autonomous de-
cisions. Along this line, legal philosopher Joel Feinberg has pos-
ited an influential argument that children possess a set of mor-
al rights to an “open future,” that is, rights not to have 
important life choices determined by others.120 Numerous au-
thors have applied Feinberg’s argument in the context of genet-
ic testing, claiming it is generally better to delay until adult-
hood the decision of whether or not to view one’s genetic 
results.121 Feinberg’s claim is that it is the autonomy of adults 
 
 116. See, e.g., Evy Cleeran et al., Public Health in the Genomic Era: Will 
Public Health Genomics Contribute to Major Changes in the Prevention of Dis-
ease?, 69 ARCHIVES PUB. HEALTH 1, 6–7 (2011). 
 117. Clarissa Allen, Karine Sénécal, & Denise Avard, Defining the Scope of 
Public Engagement: Examining the “Right Not To Know” in Public Health Ge-
nomics, 42 J.L. MED. ETHICS 11, 16 (2014). 
 118. Though not focusing on adolescent populations, recent surveys have 
found mixed results, with some people experiencing anxiety from knowing ge-
nomic results, others equanimity, and others enthusiasm. See, e.g., Jacqueline 
Duffour et al., Reproductive Decision-Making in MMR Mutation Carriers After 
Results Disclosure: Impact of Psychological Status in Childbearing Options, 25 
J. GENETIC COUNS. 433, 439 (2016) (finding that twelve percent of participants 
experienced a high level of initial stress from learning results, but that stress 
decreased over time); Schneider et al., supra note 81, at 139. 
 119. See LAURINDA HARMAN & FRANCES CORNELIUS, ETHICAL HEALTH IN-
FORMATICS 257 (3d ed. 2015). 
 120. Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 125–26 
(William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980). 
 121. See, e.g., Joseph Millum, The Foundation of the Child’s Right to an 
Open Future, 45 J. SOC. PHIL. 522, 531–34 (2014). 
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to make informed choices that is valuable, and their “rights-in-
trust” should be protected in childhood.122 
1. Adolescent Sexual Privacy 
Feinberg contends genetic information should be withheld 
until adulthood because it is in the future adult’s interest not to 
know genetic results in childhood but rather only after pos-
sessing sufficiently mature autonomy.123 In other words, there 
is an appropriate time to exercise the right, where appropriate-
ness is determined by relevant decisional capacities. By parity 
of reasoning, the appropriate time to know reproductive choice 
information should be determined by the relevant decisional 
capacities for knowing that information. The point of returning 
reproductive risks is to inform reproductive and sexual choices. 
Thus one could be said to possess the relevant decisional capac-
ities by virtue of making such choices. There are consequently 
reasons to return results of reproductive significance in adoles-
cence because eighteen percent of people have had sex by age 
fourteen or younger, thirty percent by sixteen, and most older 
teens (seventeen to nineteen) are sexually active.124 
If a child’s reproductive choice information is given to par-
ents, this does not guarantee it gets to the right actor. Parents 
might forget to inform their child—for example, if the results 
were revealed in infancy). Or they might be motivated by per-
sonal moral convictions not to return results, for example, out 
of a concern that the information will raise the chances the mi-
nor will consider abortion. It seems less likely that parents 
would maliciously withhold results and more likely that they 
would not know when to divulge them, because they do not 
know when their child will begin sexual activity. In short, giv-
ing parents the authority to be a conduit, as the ACMG and 
CSER-PWG ultimately recommend, may do little to get the in-
formation to minors when it is appropriate for them to have it. 
It would indeed seem odd to suppose that minors would ask 
 
 122. Feinberg, supra note 120. 
 123. See generally id. (concluding certain rights and responsibilities are 
best left to adults). 
 124. Lawrence B. Finer & Jesse M. Philbin, Sexual Initiation, Contracep-
tive Use, and Pregnancy Among Young Adults, 131 PEDIATRICS 886, 886 
(2013); see also Gladys M. Martinez & Joyce C. Abma, Sexual Activity, Contra-
ceptive Use, and Childbearing of Teenagers Aged 15–19 in the United States, 
209 NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS. DATA BRIEF 1, 1 (2015) (finding that, of 
fifteen to nineteen year-olds, forty-four percent of females and forty-nine per-
cent of males had had sexual intercourse). 
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their parents for this information prior to becoming sexually 
active. 
2. Increased Birth Defects in Adolescent Pregnancies 
Pregnancies in adolescence are attended by certain birth 
defect risks less likely to occur later in life. One source of in-
creased birth defect risks is that certain fetal abnormalities will 
be more likely to develop in adolescent pregnancies. For in-
stance, most pregnancies in adolescence are unplanned: the 
rate of unplanned pregnancies in sexually active teenage girls 
is twice that rate in all women.125 When this unplanned nature 
is combined with teenage drinking and lower uses of contracep-
tion in adolescents than adults, it leads to an increased risk of 
fetal alcohol syndrome.126 Further, women planning pregnan-
cies are more likely to be taking prenatal vitamins like folic ac-
id; the greater prevalence of unplanned pregnancies in adoles-
cents consequently poses an increased risk of central nervous 
system defects.127 
Another source of increased birth defect risks in adolescent 
pregnancies is the lower likelihood that those pregnancies will 
end in abortion. In 2014, eighty-five percent of abortions in the 
United States were sought by women in their 20s and 30s, 
while, according to Guttmacher Institute data, fewer than 
twelve were sought by women younger than twenty.128 In pre-
liminary data for 2015, the CDC reports that the U.S. fertility 
rate was 22.3 per 1000 women in the fifteen-to-nineteen-year-
old age group, or 249,078 births annually.129 
 
 125. Lawrence B. Finer, Unintended Pregnancy Among U.S. Adolescents: 
Accounting for Sexual Activity, 47 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 312, 313 (2010). 
 126. Ramona Allard-Hendren, Alcohol Use and Adolescent Pregnancy, 25 
AM. J. MATERNAL/CHILD NURSING 159, 159 (2000) (“Reports indicate that 
33.4% of adolescents engage in heavy episodic alcohol consumption, and that 
34.8% of adolescents are sexually active by the age of 15 without using any 
form of contraception.”). 
 127. Xi-Kuan Chen et al., Teenage Pregnancy and Congenital Anomalies: 
Which System Is Vulnerable?, 22 HUM. REPROD. 1730, 1735 (2007) (stating 
that folic acid intake decreases neural disorders and teenagers are less likely 
to take folic acid). 
 128. JENNA JERMAN ET AL., CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. ABORTION PATIENTS 
IN 2014 AND CHANGES SINCE 2008 5 (2016). 
 129. Bradley E. Hamilton et al., Births: Preliminary Data for 2015, NAT’L 
VITAL STAT. REPORTS, at 2, June 2, 2016. 
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3. Adolescent Health Information Rights as a Limitation on 
Parental Reproductive Rights 
Reproductive choice information may also warrant in utero 
protection. This Note has described return of reproductive risks 
as an adolescent right because adolescence is when sexual ac-
tivity is typically initiated. Under Feinberg’s open future anal-
ysis, the adult’s autonomy right to make a reasoned, mature 
choice whether or not to see genetic results requires protection 
throughout childhood before it can be exercised.130 Similarly, if 
adolescence is when individuals are beginning to make repro-
ductive decisions, then it may be necessary to securely store re-
productive choice information securely until then.131 Feinberg’s 
argument provides reason for withholding certain genetic in-
formation from children throughout childhood to protect their 
reproductive autonomy as adults—i.e., so they can make a ma-
ture, better-informed decision about whether or not they want 
to know that information.132 For reproductive choice infor-
mation, though, the child’s reproductive autonomy is protected 
by withholding information from parents and encouraging the 
child to access it in adolescence prior to becoming sexually ac-
tive. 
This could bring adolescent reproductive rights into ten-
sion with the protections surrounding their mothers’ abortion 
right—namely, when the adolescent was still a fetus. It seems 
possible, though, to respect both sets of reproductive rights. A 
pregnant woman, on the one hand, could be permitted to use 
fetal genomic sequencing as part of her choice to determine 
whether or not to bring a particular pregnancy to term. On the 
other, rather than being given all clinically significant results, 
she could only be given access to the subset of the fetus’s ge-
nome that is contemporaneously relevant to her reproductive 
choices. 
For instance, fetal genomic sequencing might reveal tri-
somy-21 (a missing chromosome that signals that the future 
 
 130. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 120, at 125 (distinguishing “A-C-rights” 
possessed by adults and children, such as a right not to be punched, from “A-
rights,” such as the right to vote, and “C-rights,” rooted in children’s depend-
ency on others for food, shelter, and protection). 
 131. Id. at 125–26 (“When sophisticated autonomy rights are attributed to 
children who are clearly not yet capable of exercising them, their names refer 
to rights that are to be saved for the child until he is an adult, but which can 
be violated ‘in advance,’ so to speak, before the child is even in a position to 
exercise them.”). 
 132. See Millum, supra note 121, at 535–36. 
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child will have Down syndrome), and that fact could inform the 
pregnant woman’s reproductive choice in such a way that she 
chooses to abort. If she chooses not to abort, accessing that part 
of the fetal genome would not have violated an (future) adoles-
cent right because Down syndrome is not a condition the child 
born with it risks passing on to progeny. By contrast, fetal se-
quencing that reveals the fetus is merely the carrier of a reces-
sive gene would arguably not be especially relevant to the 
pregnant woman’s reproductive choices but would be important 
to the reproductive choices of the adolescent into which the fe-
tus may develop. Thus, regardless of whether the woman 
chooses to abort, a facet of the fetal genome like carrier status 
might reasonably be kept private from a pregnant woman 
without unduly inhibiting her reproductive autonomy. While 
there may be components of the child’s genomic information 
that could be returned to parents because they reveal the par-
ent’s own reproductive risks, there remain those results, such 
as de novo mutations, that would never be relevant to parents’ 
reproductive choices. 
This Part considered whether there are stronger reasons 
not to return genomic reproductive choice information to mi-
nors than to return it. Concerns that this will cause unneces-
sary anxiety in adolescents have not yet been substantiated by 
data. Further, it is possible to withhold some of this infor-
mation in utero without unduly burdening the abortion right. 
When added to the goals of decreasing the prevalence of birth 
defects and reducing the liability clinicians face from neonatal 
litigation, there are compelling reasons to structure a regime of 
genomic healthcare to encourage individuals to know their re-
productive choice information before they become sexually ac-
tive. Doing this will require systemic, broad reforms as 
healthcare turns to precision medicine and genomics. These re-
forms are achievable and are imperative to the goal of reducing 
the prevalence of birth defects. 
III.  SECURING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN A GENOMIC 
AGE   
Part II explained why reform is needed to protect adoles-
cent reproductive rights in a genomic age. As Feinberg’s analy-
sis showed, this Note’s concern is only with adolescent rights 
for indirect reasons. First, the appropriate time to know repro-
ductive choice information is in adolescence, given statistics on 
sexual initiation. Second, adolescent rights historically have re-
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ceived little protection, which will become a pronounced con-
cern in a regime of genomic healthcare that seeks to protect re-
productive choice information. On this analysis, it is general, 
individual rights that merit protection, rights to make in-
formed reproductive choices. 
In Section A, this Part proposes conditions that will be im-
portant to secure in order to promote individual knowledge of 
reproductive choice information. In Section B, the Part antici-
pates counterarguments that may be parried against the first 
Section’s proposal. Finally, Section C offers a riposte to these 
counterarguments that explains how the competing interests at 
stake are best balanced. 
A. PROMOTING CONDITIONS TO ACT ON REPRODUCTIVE 
INFORMATION 
This Section discusses the conditions necessary for promot-
ing individual knowledge of reproductive choice information. 
First, the Section will discuss reforms that will be necessary in 
state abortion laws. Next, it will suggest reforms to clinical 
guidelines. Finally, the Section will propose that discussions of 
birth defects, genetics, and inheritance be incorporated into 
state sex education curricula. 
1. Reforms to Abortion Law and Policies 
Abortion law and policies will necessitate change to secure 
adolescent reproductive rights and promote a reduction in birth 
defects. First, this Note endorses laws that not only allow but 
use subsidy to promote the option of pre-viability termination 
for abnormalities. Second, it also endorses subsidy as a means 
of making abortion, contraception, and genetic testing mean-
ingful options for all. 
a. Ensuring Abortion Restrictions Contain Exceptions for Birth 
Defects 
Legal reforms should promote access to abortions for fetal 
abnormalities, rather than criminalizing doctors who perform 
them, as in North Dakota and Indiana. A decade before Roe, 
several states began permitting abortions for genetic abnormal-
ities after the drug thalidomide resulted in numerous cases of 
birth defects, following the recommendations of the newly pub-
lished Model Penal Code.133 Additionally, the earliest ban on 
 
 133. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 
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motive-based abortions, a 1975 Illinois law, prohibited sex-
selective abortions but explicitly created an exception for sex-
linked chromosomal abnormalities.134 
North Dakota’s law,135 in contrast, which was informed by 
model legislation from Americans United for Life,136 contains no 
exception for genetic abnormalities. Nor does the Hyde 
Amendment, under which an abortion to select against fetal 
abnormalities is not considered “medically necessary”137 be-
cause such abnormalities do not typically threaten the woman’s 
life. In addition to such bans, anti-abortion efforts have pushed 
mandatory requirements like ultrasounds and counseling prior 
to an abortion as ways to burden the abortion right and protect 
the state’s interest in fetal life. The attendant opportunity 
costs, travel time, physical invasiveness, and other facets bur-
den the abortion right in the name of informed consent and a 
woman’s “right to know.”138 Not only should these bans be 
struck down as violating the abortion right, there are also pub-
lic health reasons to reject them since the effect of these laws is 
to increase the prevalence of birth defects. 
 
1962) (stating that if a fetus would have serious defects, abortion would be jus-
tified). 
 134. 720 ILL. ANN. STAT. 510/6(8) (1975). 
 135. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013). For an article that extensively 
discusses the constitutionality of North Dakota’s law, see Carole Peterson, Re-
productive Justice, Public Policy, and Abortion on the Basis of Fetal Impair-
ment: Lessons from International Human Rights Law and the Potential Impact 
of the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, 28 J.L. HEALTH 121 
(2015). 
 136. North Dakota 2014 Report Card, AM. UNITED FOR LIFE, http://www 
.aul.org/states/north-dakota (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). Describing itself as 
“the legal architect and builder of the pro-life movement,” Americans United 
for Life was formed in 1971, with its major objectives including ending all 
abortions and reversing Roe. Issues, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, http://www.aul 
.org/issue (last visited Aug. 15, 2015). It is currently active in most states, and 
the organization claimed credit for twenty-four of the ninety-two abortion re-
striction laws that were passed in 2011. It was also the organization spear-
heading efforts in Virginia to require invasive ultrasounds before an abortion 
could be performed, and also trying to shut down all abortion clinics in Kan-
sas, among other efforts. Kate Sheppard, Wham, Bam, Sonogram! Meet the 
Ladies Setting the New Pro-Life Agenda, MOTHER JONES, http://www 
.motherjones.com/politics/2012/08/americans-united-for-life-anti-abortion 
-transvaginal-ultrasound (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
 137. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 298 (1980). 
 138. In Casey, the Court found the state’s informed consent requirement to 
be unconstitutional as being merely “under the guise of securing informed con-
sent,” failing to advance a legitimate state interest. Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 934 (1992) (emphasis added). 
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b. Ensuring Meaningful Access to Abortion, Contraception, 
and Genetic Testing 
Instead of burdening the abortion right, a better approach 
is to make reproductive choice information and reproductive 
risk avoidance accessible options. Prior to its decision in Harris 
v. McRae upholding the Hyde Amendment, the Supreme Court 
had found constitutional a Connecticut law imposing abortion 
payments on indigent women, stressing that “Connecticut’s 
regulation is rationally related to and furthers the state’s legit-
imate interest in encouraging normal childbirth.”139 Though 
abnormality-selective abortion bans and the Hyde Amend-
ment’s bar on the use of Medicaid funds for such abortions may 
promote a state’s interest in preventing the termination of fetal 
life, they run contrary to the state’s interest in normal child-
birth. In making reproductive risk avoidance more accessible, 
the Strong Start for Mothers and Newborns Initiative of the 
Department of Health and Human Services is an exemplar in 
the right direction, funding nearly 200 sites with “enhanced 
prenatal care approaches” to reduce premature births among 
pregnant Medicaid or CHIP beneficiaries.140 
States should also look to California’s comprehensive regu-
lations to decrease birth defect risks.141 California administers a 
statewide prenatal testing program offering ultrasound, amnio-
centesis, CVS, and testing for genetic disorders and birth de-
fects.142 To this end, the state administers a program of subsidy 
grants for nonprofit prenatal diagnosis centers to offer such 
services,143 and requires that testing at these centers be accom-
panied by genetic counseling.144 Overall, the program seeks to 
educate clinicians and the public “concerning the uses of prena-
tal testing and the availability of the program,”145 and imple-
ments statewide postings where environmental can increase 
 
 139. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 464 (1977) (emphasis added); see also id. 
at 477–79 (repeating the emphasis on the state’s legitimate interest in the 
normalcy of childbirth). 
 140. Strong Start for Mothers and Newborns Initiative: General Infor-
mation, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID, https://innovation.cms.gov/ 
initiatives/Strong-Start/index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
 141. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125050–125119.5 (2015). 
 142. Id. § 125050. 
 143. Id. § 125055(e). 
 144. Id. § 125055(c). 
 145. Id. § 125055(b)(1). 
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birth defect risks.146 These are all excellent ways to promote 
knowledge of reproductive choice information. 
2. Clinical Reforms To Promote Return of Reproductive Risks 
Medical recommendations should be reformed to reflect the 
liability that clinicians and others face from neonatal torts, and 
to reflect the heightened legal protections accorded to an ado-
lescent’s reproductive choice information. Both goals could be 
furthered by directly and privately returning adolescents their 
reproductive risks. If the child’s genome has already been se-
quenced, private return of results could involve withholding re-
productive choice information until adolescence and then ask-
ing parents to step out of the room before results are disclosed. 
In this way, clinical reforms could strengthen the adolescent-
physician relationship. 
3. Introducing Reproductive Risks into Sex Education 
Public interests are best served by encouraging knowledge 
of reproductive risks in early adolescence rather than waiting 
until adulthood. Teaching individuals about reproductive risks 
before the average individual is sexually active could be a ra-
tional, legitimate means through which to promote state inter-
ests in encouraging normal pregnancy outcomes, fewer un-
wanted pregnancies (those that result in birth defects), and 
potentially fewer abortions (by encouraging individuals to 
make pre-conception choices that decrease the prevalence of fe-
tal abnormalities). There are clear differences between support-
ing choices not to conceive after learning of a reproductive risk 
and choices to abort after testing reveals a fetal abnormality. 
Both pro-choice and anti-abortion advocates are more likely to 
coalesce over supporting the former.147 
Those with more conservative views on sex and reproduc-
tion may raise potential countervailing interests. These include 
objections that public sex education in general is an implicit 
stamp of approval on premarital sexual activity, that it should 
only be taught in the home, or that it should promote absti-
nence as the best option.148 The incorporation of reproductive 
risks into extant sex curricula, however, would be cautionary 
 
 146. Id. § 125055(b)(2)(A). 
 147. See infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text. 
 148. See generally Plan for Defeating PP – Education: Defeating Planned 
Parenthood’s Public School Sex Education Programs, STOPP INT’L, http://www 
.stopp.org/plan/E (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
  
858 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:827 
 
with regard to sex—not a scare tactic but a realistic presenta-
tion of birth defect risks faced by the general population and 
subpopulations, as well as the attendant “moral hazard”149 of 
sexual activity created by the possibility of birth defects. Gen-
eral education about these risks would not incline non-sexually 
active individuals to initiate sexual activity, and it would en-
courage those who are sexually active to take into account in-
formation relevant for responsible sexual and reproductive 
choices. 
Further, public interests in efficient allocation of resources 
are served by encouraging knowledge of reproductive risks. For 
example, one could argue it costs taxpayers less money to use 
public funds for abortion, since the alternative might be a 
greater allocation of funds to support children who otherwise 
would have been aborted.150 Public costs are multiplied several 
fold if the child is born with a serious disorder for which ame-
liorative, intensive measures immediately after birth can be 
taken. Costs are even higher than this when congenital im-
pairments cannot be fully corrected, requiring neonatal care 
and a lifetime of disability-related public entitlements.151 
 
 149. Seana Shiffrin, “Wrongful Life,” Procreative Responsibility, and the 
Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 117–18, 137 (1999) (describing all 
choices to procreate to be “morally hazardous” under liberal theory, since pro-
creation involves imposing non-consensual harms on the person who comes 
into existence); see also DAVID BENATAR, BETTER NEVER TO HAVE BEEN: THE 
HARM OF COMING INTO EXISTENCE (2008) (arguing for the “anti-natal” view—
that it is always wrong to have children—and discussing how combining the 
anti-natal view with common pro-choice views about fetal moral status yield a 
“pro-death” view about abortion at the earlier stages of gestation); Seana 
Shiffrin, Harm and Its Moral Significance, 18 LEGAL THEORY 357, 358 (2009) 
(examining the definition of “harm” from birth defects in a legal and philo-
sophical sense). 
 150. See, e.g., Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 794 
(Cal. 1981) (“[W]hatever money is saved by refusing to fund abortions will be 
spent many times over in paying maternity care and childbirth expenses and 
supporting the children of indigent mothers.”). 
 151. Grounding these public interests on cost savings is a delicate matter. 
It may reasonably offend those living with disabilities if public cost savings is 
a reason for encouraging fewer people with congenital birth defects from com-
ing into existence. This Note has described return of reproductive risks as a 
public health issue not because of the healthcare costs associated with birth 
defects. Rather, by stressing the importance of returning genomic reproductive 
choice information, this Note has emphasized the value of giving patients the 
choice to know and act on such information, leaving it for them, rather than 
states, to choose how to act in light of that information. See, e.g., Schneider, 
supra note 81, at 141 (noting that participants “described how offering choice 
is paramount to making genomic carrier screening ‘worth knowing’ since peo-
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Finally, public interests are served by policies that buttress 
contraception and abortion as fundamental liberty rights, 
rights to make one’s own decisions autonomously and not being 
unduly burdened in making major life decisions, such as 
whether or not to have a child. One author gives the example of 
a woman in her mid-30s who finds her reproductive autonomy 
constrained because she did not know about the increased risk 
of infertility she would face because of her age; the lack of edu-
cation on this front “constrains her ability to make a fully in-
formed choice about when to have children.”152 A lack of infor-
mation and misinformation can similarly constrain adolescent 
reproductive autonomy. For instance, many U.S. college-aged 
women report that the lesson that they learned from their 
school’s sex education was to “be safe and use protection” and 
“use birth control so you don’t get pregnant,” which may con-
tribute to a misperception that it is normal to have very high 
fertility.153 In the case of reproductive risks, the current absence 
of discussions about birth defects and genetic testing in public 
sex education may give adolescents the misimpression that 
those risks do not exist. In reality, ten to twenty percent of all 
pregnancies result in abnormalities severe enough that the fe-
tus is miscarried,154 birth defects occur in one of thirty-three 
births, and they are the leading cause of infant deaths.155 
With the goal of informing reproductive decisions when in-
dividuals start making them, this education should begin in 
middle school, since a substantial amount of the population is 
sexually active by then.156 The integration in recent years of us-
er-friendly technologies like tablets into both the educational 
and clinical spheres can support comprehension in early ado-
lescence of key concepts like DNA and genetics. The Integrative 
Genomics Viewer, for example, allows individuals who have 
their genome sequenced to view the entire sequence on an iPad, 
with interactive features enabling them to zoom in to particular 
 
ple will bring their unique range of emotions, expectations, and prior experi-
ences into their decision-making”). 
 152. Lucke, supra note 19, at 58. 
 153. Tanya L. Boone, Messages About Sexuality: An Ecological Perspective, 
15 SEX, SEXUALITY & SOC’Y 437, 437 (2015). 
 154. Miscarriage, MAYO CLINIC (July 20, 2016), http://www.mayoclinic.org/ 
diseases-conditions/pregnancy-loss-miscarriage/basics/definition/con 
-20033827. 
 155. Birth Defects, supra note 102. 
 156. Finer & Philbin, supra note 124, at 888 (stating that around 7.9 per-
cent of adolescents have had sex by their fourteenth birthday). 
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segments and variants, with explanations of their signifi-
cance.157 
In high school, the topic can further be incorporated into 
classes in the natural sciences, especially through discussions 
of inheritance in biology.158 Discussions of contraception and 
abortion should be supplemented with discussions of genetic 
and genomic testing, including carrier screening and prenatal 
diagnosis. Other efforts could highlight the potential effects of 
environmental toxins, tobacco, and alcohol use while pregnant, 
as well as the benefit of prenatal vitamins. Reproductive risks 
are almost entirely absent in most states’ sex education curric-
ula and in any federal sex-education “common core,”159 a lacuna 
that this Note has argued will become palpable in a genomic 
age. 
B. ACCOMMODATING POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
A variety of interest groups may object to the proposals 
suggested in the first section of this Part. Objections may come 
from anti-abortion, pro-choice, and disability rights interest 
groups, as well as groups with conservative sexual values. This 
Section briefly considers the counterarguments these interest 
groups might marshal against a regime that promotes 
knowledge of reproductive information. 
1. Abortion-Related Objections 
Anti-abortion objections only seem to apply inasmuch as 
knowledge of reproductive choice information is associated with 
contraception and abortion. Regarding contraception, consider 
the Pope’s recent comment that, in the face of the risk of 
microcephalic births, contraception may be the “lesser of two 
evils.”160 More strenuous religious objections would likely focus 
not on abstinence or birth control as ways of avoiding birth de-
fects, but rather on the use of abortion.161 
 
 157. Helga Thorvaldsdóttir et al., A Genomic Data Viewer for iPad, 16 GE-
NOME BIOLOGY 46 (2015) (explaining the Integrative Genomics Viewer app for 
iPad). 
 158. E.g., Kassuba, supra note 18 (listing ideas of how to integrate infor-
mation about genetic disorders in lesson plans). 
 159. See SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., GUIDELINES FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE SEXUALITY EDUCATION: KINDERGARTEN – 12TH GRADE (3d 
ed., 2004) (containing no content about reproductive risks). 
 160. Zika Virus: Pope Hints at Relaxation of Contraception Ban, BRITISH 
BROAD. CORP. (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-35608324. 
 161. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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Pro-choice advocates may raise objections as well. Most no-
tably, it is possible that public subsidies making abortion and 
genetic testing more accessible could in some cases inhibit re-
productive autonomy. Jennifer Denbow, for example, puts pres-
sure on the distinction between reproductive choice and repro-
ductive autonomy by noting the example of a woman who fears 
abuse if she does not obtain an abortion.162 Tweaking Denbow’s 
example to fit the context of subsidizing genetic testing options, 
one might imagine a woman with an abusive partner who in no 
circumstances wants a child born with serious impairments. 
Such a hypothetical could be even more likely to lead to abuse 
than the woman’s choice not to abort a healthy child. In short, a 
personalized medicine culture in which genetic testing is wide-
spread will increase reproductive choice, but this will not al-
ways thereby increase reproductive autonomy. 
At least in the pre-conception context, one would anticipate 
consensus between anti-abortion and pro-choice interest groups 
on policies that encourage responsible pre-conception reproduc-
tive decisions, by increasing the availability of reproductive 
choice information. Even in the post-conception context, recent 
surveys support broad consensus for permitting abortions to se-
lect against serious defects; in a 2012 survey by the National 
Opinion Research Council, 77.1 percent of people polled indi-
cated they believed a woman should be able to obtain an abor-
tion “if there is a serious defect in the fetus,”163 while a Gallup 
poll in the same year found that only forty-one percent of Amer-
icans identified as pro-choice.164 Thus there is good reason to 
think legislative initiatives to provide public subsidy of prena-
tal testing options would garner broad public support across 
party lines. Individuals will likely find this increase in repro-
ductive choices valuable,165 whether or not they utilize such op-
tions. 
 
 162. Jennifer Denbow, Abortion: When Choice and Autonomy Conflict, 20 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 216, 217 (2005) (“[In] the extreme case of the 
poor, abused, pregnant woman . . . the option to terminate her pregnancy can 
act to undermine this woman’s autonomy . . . .”). 
 163. TOM W. SMITH & JAESOK SON, TRENDS IN PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO-
WARDS ABORTION (2013), http://www.norc.org/pdfs/gss%20reports/trends% 
20in%20attitudes%20about%20abortion_final.pdf. 
 164. Abortion, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
 165. Schneider, supra note 81 (finding that participants in genetic screen-
ing found the experience valuable). 
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2. Disability Rights Objections 
The strongest case for increasing knowledge of reproduc-
tive risks is the avoidance of especially serious congenital con-
ditions, such as those that are painful and lethal in early child-
hood.166 However, this creates a slippery slope. Microcephaly 
may be accompanied by profound cognitive impairment, but 
children with it typically can still experience over a decade of 
life.167 Down syndrome is associated with cognitive impairment, 
heart defects, and shortened lifespans, but according to one 
frequently cited survey, those with the syndrome express a 
high level of wellbeing and satisfaction with life.168 Further 
 
 166. Some wrongful life claims brought on behalf of infants born with such 
conditions. See, e.g., Viccaro v. Milunski, 551 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Mass. 1990) (“Adam 
. . . will require special medical care throughout his life and will suffer sub-
stantial physical pain and mental anguish.”); Iafelice by Iafelice v. Zarafu, 534 
A.2d 417, 417 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (discussing an infant being born 
with hydrocephalus, causing “interventricular hemorrhage and hydrocephalus 
so that she now functions at the level of a four-month-old infant who will re-
quire permanent institutional care”); Spencer v. Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126 (Okla. 
1987) (discussing an infant being born with hydrocephalus); Payne v. Myers, 
743 P.2d 186, 187 (Utah 1987) (describing the syndrome as “a rare, genetically 
transmitted, and progressively degenerative neurological disorder that is 
characterized by widespread demyelination of the brain sheath, causing severe 
motor disorders and eventually death”); Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 638 F. Supp. 
979 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (discussing how the plaintiff, Jennifer Gallagher, died 
within three weeks of birth as a result of the defects from Trisomy 9); Gold-
berg v. Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d 530, 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“Jeffrey Goldberg . . . 
alleged . . . he ‘was born with Tay-Sachs disease and has suffered and will con-
tinue to suffer loss of motor function, loss of sensory function, blindness, deaf-
ness, pain, disability and numerous other injuries resulting in damages of a 
personal, permanent and pecuniary nature and finally certain death.’”); Rubin 
v. Hamot Med. Ctr., 478 A.2d 869 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (discussing an infant 
being born with Tay Sachs disease); Dorlin v. Providence Hosp., 325 N.W.2d 
600, 601 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (describing plaintiff Desiree’s future prospects 
as “a life of disease, sickness, and suffering”). 
 167. Imaizumi, supra note 11, at 133. 
 168. Brian G. Skotko et al., Self Perceptions from People with Down Syn-
drome, 155A AM. J. MED. GENETICS 2360 (2013); see also Brian Skotko, With 
New Prenatal Testing, Will Babies with Down Syndrome Slowly Disappear?, 
94 ARCH. DISEASE CHILDHOOD 823 (2009) (discussing the potentially decreas-
ing incidence of babies born with Down Syndrome due to prenatal testing); 
Monica Rafie & Tracy Winsor, How Can We Stop More Down Syndrome Babies 
from Being Aborted?, LIFESITE (Dec. 16, 2011), https://www.lifesitenews 
.com/all/date/2011/12/16#article-how-can-we-stop-more-down-syndrome-babies 
-from-being-aborted (citing heavily to Brian G. Skotko); Malcolm Ritter, Com-
fort or Conflict: Earlier Down Syndrome Test, WASH. TIMES (June 12, 2011), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jun/12/comfort-or-conflict-earlier 
-down-syndrome-test (citing to Skotko as someone against disability-selective 
abortions); Brian Skotko, Will America Cull People with Down Syndrome?, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 15, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/ 
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congenital “impairments” could include late-onset conditions 
like Huntington’s disease, or less severe conditions, like color-
blindness or anosmia, the inability to smell. At some point, it is 
unclear whether such a condition has sufficient normative sali-
ence to be considered a reproductive risk. 
Normative salience and individual reproductive choices, in 
turn, will largely be informed by the severity classification of 
the congenital condition. This is borne out by two 2016 publica-
tions offering a reproductive decision aid for patients who un-
dergo preconception screening via genomic sequencing.169 In de-
veloping a taxonomy of birth defects, a taxonomy empirically 
validated to reflect both patient and expert judgments,170 there 
was ample disagreement regarding what conditions should be 
classified as “serious.”171 As the authors conclude, “Determining 
what conditions are described as ‘serious’ is complicated by the 
subjectivity of the label and the potentially wide-ranging socie-
tal implications of that label.”172 
A particular risk created by the slippery slope of defining 
severity is the expressive effect it may have on the community 
of people living with disabilities. This is the sentiment evident 
behind Indiana’s 2016 abnormality-selective abortion ban,173 as 
well as behind failed 2015 legislative bills in Ohio174 and South 
Dakota.175 Similarly, recommending to people that a child with 
hereditary deafness is a “risk”—as seems implicit in newborn 
aural screening tests routinized in every state—might smack of 
ablism to the deaf community.176 
 
forum/story/2011-11-14/blood-test-downsyndrome/51202078/1 (discussing 
Sequenom’s MaterniT21 test); Rebecca Taylor, 99% of Adults with Down Syn-
drome Report Being Happy in Life, LIFENEWS (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www 
.lifenews.com/2011/10/06/99-of-adults-with-down-syndrome-report-being 
-happy-in-life (“The culture of death says, ‘Better dead than have Downs.’ But 
99% of adults with Down Syndrome report they are happy with their lives . . . . 
[T]he price of embracing the culture of death, of using death as a ‘medical 
treatment’—it is quite literally the elimination of happiness.”). 
 169. Korngiebel et al., supra note 72. 
 170. Leo et al., supra note 72. 
 171. Id. at 579–80 (“Participants had difficulty distinguishing between 
mild and serious medical problems . . . the appraisal of severity may be more 
complex than we anticipated.”). 
 172. Korngiebel et al., supra note 72, at 566. 
 173. Tribune News Serv., supra note 36. 
 174. H.B. 135, 131st Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2015). 
 175. H.B. 1156, 90th Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2015). 
 176. A critique of ableism might stress that “disability” and “impairment” 
are in large part socially constructed concepts. See, e.g., Ron Amundson, Disa-
bility, Ideology, and Quality of Life: A Bias in Biomedical Ethics, in QUALITY 
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To mitigate this potential slippery slope, there should be 
efforts to provide individuals and potential parents with accu-
rate, unbiased information about reproductive risks. For exam-
ple, a geneticist known for opposing selection against Down 
syndrome177 contends that the obstetric view of the syndrome is 
overall negative.178 One response to this concern can be seen in 
laws in Massachusetts,179 Virginia,180 Kentucky,181 and Mis-
souri,182 according to which health departments must provide 
physicians with the most up-to-date information on life with 
Down syndrome and treatment options. Doctors are encouraged 
to give this information to all pregnant women who receive a 
prenatal Down syndrome diagnosis. While the first three states 
leave dissemination of this information optional, Missouri re-
quires doctors to provide it.183 Unbiased return of results is part 
of the basic standard of care required of genetic counselors and 
other clinical personnel.184 Holistic information can be a mean-
ingful corrective to any coercive pressures the availability of 
testing creates—pressures to avoid birth defects—and it can 
help dispel inaccurate beliefs in the general public about life 
with disabilities. 
Thus this Note concludes that a genomic healthcare system 
cannot escape problems of choosing which unknown variants to 
 
OF LIFE AND HUMAN DIFFERENCE: GENETIC TESTING, HEALTHCARE, AND DIS-
ABILITY 101, 101–24 (David Wasserman et al. eds., 2005); Harlan Lane, Do 
Deaf People Have a Disability?, 2 SIGN LANG. STUD. 356 (2002); Solveig 
Reindal, Disability, Gene Therapy, and Eugenics–A Challenge to John Harris, 
26 J. MED. ETHICS 89 (2000). 
 177. See supra note 168 (concerning specifically works written by author 
Brian Skotko). 
 178. Brian Skotko, Prenatally Diagnosed Down Syndrome: Mothers Who 
Continue Their Pregnancies Evaluate Their Health Providers, 192 AM. J. OB-
STETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 670, 676 (2005). 
 179. MA. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 70H(b) (2016) (requiring up-to-date infor-
mation and contact information on Down Syndrome resource centers). 
 180. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2403.01(b) (2016) (requiring “up-to-date, scien-
tific information”). 
 181. KY. REV. STAT. § 211.192 (2015) (requiring “up-to-date, evidence based 
information”). 
 182. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.923.1 (2015) (requiring “current information”). 
 183. Id. § 191.923.3 (2015) (“The physician . . . shall provide the patient 
with current information.” (emphasis added)).  
 184. E.g., Vasantha Muthuswamy, Ethical Issues in Genetic Counselling 
with Special Reference to Haemoglobinopathies, 134 INDIAN J. MED. RES. 547, 
548 (2011) (“Nondirective counselling, a hallmark of the genetics profession, is 
largely in accordance with the principle of respect for patient autonomy and 
incorporates . . . other ethical principles as well.”). 
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prioritize in research, which results should be returned to clini-
cians, and which ones should be returned to parents and ado-
lescents. In making such choices, genomic healthcare will inevi-
tably implicate concerns of the disabled community. This Note 
has situated return of results in the context of the relationships 
between adolescent, physician, and parent. In these contexts, 
individuals have constitutionally protected rights to access con-
traception and abortion, and neonatal litigation has shown the 
extent courts are willing to compensate plaintiffs when mal-
practice is the proximate cause of birth defects. We should not 
ignore the threats to communities of people with disabilities 
that could develop in a regime that more effectively sought to 
eliminate birth defects, but nor should we capitulate in letting 
those concerns stymie progress in reducing the prevalence of 
birth defects. 
  CONCLUSION   
Clinical genomics is a quickly burgeoning field, with collec-
tion of individual genomic data already occurring in the prena-
tal and early childhood contexts at the initiation of parents, 
and further collection and return to parents likely soon to be-
come routine through state-run newborn genomic screening 
programs. Such a healthcare regime will necessitate regulatory 
reform to protect the interests of adolescents, parents, women, 
clinicians, and future children when sequencing reveals results 
of reproductive significance. 
This Note has endorsed state subsidy of options to increase 
reproductive choice information, including newborn genomic 
screening, sex education about birth defects, prenatal testing, 
and individual pre-conception carrier screening via sequencing. 
Stressing pre-conception knowledge of reproductive choice in-
formation can make options possible that reduce the prevalence 
of birth defects, promotes reproductive autonomy, and seems 
acceptable to anti-abortion interest groups. Their interests and 
those of disability rights groups can be furthered by requiring 
holistic, accurate information about life with birth defects to be 
provided to women considering a post-abnormality-diagnosis 
abortion. 
The Note has stressed the values of reproductive autonomy 
and of decreasing the prevalence of serious birth defects, which 
implicitly suggests the value of neonatal litigation. That is, the 
Note has defended the value of knowing reproductive choice in-
formation, such that individuals can have a legitimate claim 
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against clinicians for failing to disclose such information. Neo-
natal torts have received a hostile reaction from states, yet they 
will be an important safeguard in a genomic age to ensure cli-
nicians disclose reproductive choice information. There is some 
traction to the claim that increased liability will induce provid-
ers to offer less testing, avoiding a potential source of liability. 
However, this line of reasoning fails to account for the anteced-
ent professional recommendations that clinicians should return 
reproductive choice information; given those guidelines, a fail-
ure to offer testing itself would breach a clinician’s duty of care. 
If neonatal causes of action are allowed in more jurisdictions, 
courts should be cognizant that obstetricians already are sub-
ject to more liability than any other medical subfield (excepting 
neurosurgery);185 coupled with the new role of genomics and the 
complexity of understanding and conveying genomic results, 
this should color expectations of what can reasonably be ex-
pected of clinicians.186 
Birth defect epidemics, from the thousands of infants born 
with congenital rubella syndrome from 1962 to 1965,187 to the 
thousands expected to be born with microcephaly in 2016 be-
cause of the Zika epidemic, raise public awareness of this 
Note’s topic. But the risk of birth defects attends every preg-
nancy. Thus this Note has proposed structural reforms for the 
impending regime of genomic healthcare to facilitate return of 
reproductive choice information. The question of how to re-
spond to the unfortunate reality of birth defects involves having 
to balance incompatible anti-abortion, pro-choice, pro-parental, 
and pro-disability interests. Yet rather than allowing this to 
stymie progress in abortion politics, this Note has proffered a 
modus vivendi that strikes a balance between these competing 
interests in the service of making headway in decreasing the 
prevalence of birth defects. 
By increasing access to reproductive choice information, as 
well as access to the reproductive technologies that allow one to 
act on that information, states can thereby help create the con-
 
 185. Adam S. Levine, The Best and Worst States for OB/GYN Practice: A 
Professional Liability Perspective, CONTEMP. OB/GYN (Apr. 6, 2015), http:// 
contemporaryobgyn.modernmedicine.com/contemporary-obgyn/news/best-and 
-worst-states-obgyn-practice-professional-liability-perspective-0. 
 186. The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology has suggested 
there may be a shortage of 9000 to 14,000 obstetricians over the next twenty 
years, in part, because of the cost of professional liability insurance, and be-
cause of a fear of being sued. Id. 
 187. RUBIN, supra note 13, at 21. 
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ditions necessary for individuals to make informed reproductive 
choices. The themes developed in this Note underlie important 
facets that will continue to take form as the global community 
seeks to halt Zika virus, however, since the birth defects are 
not resultant from genetic variation, those issues are not pecu-
liar to genomic healthcare. Still, genetic birth defects are not a 
rare occurrence, and this Note has attempted to make initial 
headway in anticipating and resolving some of the myriad is-
sues they will pose in a genomic age. 
